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Introduction
Banks have played a crucial role in the making and spread of the recent financial crisis. Indeed, at the most critical moment of the crisis, the key player was none other than a bank, Lehman Brothers, whose default sparked the most acute phase, and had a number of immediate repercussions on the whole system. 1 The demise of the American investment bank is considered an important event not only because it was responsible for a sudden collapse in global business confidence -it was the first time that a major bank was allowed to fail -but also because it marked a watershed in the history of credit default swaps (CDS). The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and, shortly afterwards, the near downfall of the insurance conglomerate American International Group (AIG), both of which were involved in the CDS sector, polarised attention towards the CDS activities of the major international banks.
CDS, the most widespread form of credit derivative, have been, according to some, responsible for exacerbating the effects of the recent financial crisis (Dickinson, 2008; Stulz, 2009; Kress, 2010) .
CDS were originally created in the 1990s by JP Morgan, and consist of an agreement between two parties, the so-called protection buyer and protection seller. The protection seller undertakes, in exchange for a premium paid by the protection buyer, to pay out if a specific credit event 2 occurs, typically the default of a third debtor, the so-called reference entity. CDS are thus contracts that make it possible to isolate and transfer credit risk (Ashraf et al., 2007 , Jarrow, 2011 . Owing to these constituent features, CDS spreads have become increasingly popular as a simple, direct indicator of a firm's credit risk, especially during the financial crisis. As pointed out by Hart and Zingales (2010) , a CDS can be seen as a bet on an institution's strength and therefore its price or spread reflects the probability that the debt will not be repaid in full. Put simply, the CDS spread can be seen as an indication of the risk the bank will fail. When banks' risk increase, one would expect CDS spreads to increase thus providing direct market discipline and influence bank risk taking behaviour (and/or trigger regulatory action). However, in practice the functioning of this market discipline mechanism is not clear cut and depends both on the financial system institutional structure (for example, the design of the safety net, the strength of property rights, the incentives to information disclosure) and on investors' behaviour and macroeconomic conditions. Balasubramnian and Cyree (2011) document that the yields spreads on bank-issued subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) are sensitive to bank risk, but the presence of implicit guarantees such as the too-big-to-fail policy, may reduce the levels to which they reflect bank-specific risks. A number of studies seem to indicate that, because of its inherent characteristics, the CDS market is more efficient than the bond market in pricing credit risk and in anticipating rating changes (Zhu, 2004; Di Cesare and Guazzarotti, 2010) . Nonetheless, the recent financial crisis cast doubt on the effectiveness of CDS spreads as an indicator of risk, as it became evident that the dramatic increases in CDS spreads could not be fully explained by increases in banks credit risk. During the period 1 July 2007 to 31 March 2009 CDS spread values grew considerably and displayed record peaks (see Figure 1 ) that can only be explained taking into account the overall market situation.
As pointed out by Annaert et al. (2010) , CDS spread changes that are driven by the increased credit risk of individual financial institutions should signal to regulators that they need to pay closer attention to the institution's financial health. On the other hand, when CDS spread changes are not related to fundamentals (as during the crisis period), the market's ability to correctly price for risk becomes questionable. This paper aims to build upon this recent strand of the literature (Eichengreen et al., 2009; Huang et al., 2009; Raunig and Scheicher, 2009; Annaert et al., 2010; Constantinos, 2010; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Hart and Zingales, 2010; by investigating the determinants of CDS spreads to understand whether CDS spreads can be considered a good proxy for bank risk. In particular, we estimate the relationship between bank balance sheet ratios and bank CDS spreads both in the pre-crisis period, in the crisis and post-crisis period. This paper makes three contributions to the related literature. Firstly, this study is one of few concerned exclusively with bank CDS spreads at an international level: most other studies examine a mix of industrial and financial firms. 4 A number of reasons led to the decision to consider only CDSs spreads in the banking sector. Very little is known about what actually drives credit spreads in general and bank CDS spreads in particular (Annaert et al., 2010) . Moreover, variables that are found to affect credit spreads of non-financial companies often lose their explanatory power when applied to financials (e.g. Boss and Scheicher, 2005; Raunig and Scheicher, 2008) .
Our second contribution relates to the analysis of the determinants of CDS spreads; we chose to concentrate only on bank balance sheet ratios, rather than considering both market-specific and firm-specific factors; with the sole exception of leverage. To the best of our knowledge, no study in the related literature has used specifically balance sheet variables to explain variation in CDS spreads. Most empirical papers (see for example Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Bystrom, 2005; Zhang et al., 2005; Duffie et al., 2007; Das et al., 2008) investigating the explanatory power of credit risk variables for bond and CDS include in the model several variables to proxy for business conditions, market conditions and/or uncertainty (term structure of interest rates, market return, market volatility, etc.). We are conscious of the influence market variables have on CDS spreads, however in this paper, because of the time period considered, we decided to focus only on the correlation between balance sheet ratios and CDS spreads. In periods of financial stress, market data fluctuate wildly, therefore biasing the relationship with accounting variables.
Moreover, changes in market data during a crisis period do not necessarily reflect the changes in credit risk but may be driven by investors' panic and lack of trust. Finally, this paper is one of the first contributions on bank CDS spreads that also takes into account the post-crisis period.
The results of the empirical analysis can be summarised as follows. Firstly, bank CDS spreads reflect the risk captured by bank balance sheet ratios. Hence bank CDS spreads are a good proxy of bank risk. Secondly, the relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet ratios becomes stronger during the crisis and post-crisis period. Thirdly, bank CDS spreads seems to be influenced by different variables in the pre-crisis and crisis period. Fourthly, variables that a priory would be considered as determinants of CDSs spread, the TIER 1 Ratio and the Leverage, appear insignificant in all of the periods considered. Finally, as expected, the bank CDS market in the precrisis period showed little interest in any of the liquidity indices considered.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant literature. Sections 3 and 4 discuss data and empirical methodology respectively. Sections 5 and 6 present empirical results and robustness tests. Finally, Section 7 summarises the major findings and concludes the paper.
Literature review
Research on CDS spreads is still limited, mostly because the credit derivatives market in general and the CDS market in particular has only gained a substantial size since the early 2000s. 5 The CDS literature is composed of two groups of studies, one focussing on the pricing characteristics of CDS spreads, and the other investigating the determinants of CDS spreads and their variation.
To the first group belong the empirical analyses that demonstrate the price leadership of CDS spreads over corporate bond spreads in measuring firm-specific credit risk. Various reasons underlie this claim. Hull et al. (2004) , Das and Hanouna (2006) , Zhu (2006) and Ericsson et al. (2009) point out that CDS contracts are quoted directly in term of spreads 6 , while bond spreads require a number of complicating assumptions and calculations, for example, the specification of a benchmark risk free yield curve before credit spreads can be calculated. Blanco et al. (2005) , Zhu (2006) , Alexopoulou et al. (2009), and Norden and Weber (2009) show that the CDS market leads the corporate bond market in terms of price discovery. Volz and Wedow (2010) , Constantinos (2010) , Flannery (2010) , Norden and Weber (2010) find that CDS markets convey information on banks' default risk that is suited to play an important role in enhancing market discipline. In particular, they believe that the CDS market is of particular importance for banking supervisors.
The second group comprises the empirical analyses that investigate the determinants of CDS spreads. The credit risk literature identifies two different approaches: the structural approach and the reduced form approach.
The structural models, derived from the option pricing model originally developed by Black and Scholes (1973) , are based on firms' structural variables, in other words firm-specific (i.e. rating, leverage, market capitalisation, asset volatility, stock price changes, etc.) and market-specific factors (i.e. term structure of interest rates, market return, market volatility, etc.), and consider default a function of endogenous elements. The first author to apply the option pricing model to insolvency was Merton (1974) , who based his formulation on the assumption that insolvency arises solely and exclusively if at bond maturity date a firm's assets are worth less its liabilities.
Subsequently, a number of generalizations on Merton's model were proposed, the first by Black and Cox (1976) (cf. also Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Anderson and Sundaresan, 1996; Anderson et al., 1996; Mella-Barral, 1997; and Zhou, 2001) . These considered the possibility of default prior to bond maturity if the value of the firm's assets fell below a certain level, the threshold or default boundary.
The reduced form models emerged in the second half of the 1990s thanks to contributions from a number of scholars (the most significant were Lando, 1994 Lando, , 1998 Jarrow and Turnbull, 1995; White, 2000 White, , 2001 . Reduced form models are a recent approach to credit risk, and treat default as a sudden surprise, a totally exogenous event that is unrelated to the firm's balance sheet. The reason for default is not specified.
The structural models have been widely preferred to the reduced form models by practitioners in the field of credit risk, because the reduced form approach has been criticised on the grounds of the weak economic rationale for the occurrence of a default event (Alexopoulou et al., 2009 ).
There is a substantial literature that builds on the structural models to analyse movements in CDS spreads. 7 Among the studies focusing on the structural models' theoretical determinants of CDS spreads are Aunon-Nerin et al. (2002) , Benkert (2004) , Zhang et al. (2005) and Abid and Naifar and rating announcements (Daniels and Shin Jensen, 2004; Hull et al., 2004; Norden and Weber, 2004; Blanco et al., 2005; and Lehnert and Neske, 2006) . Previously, research had analysed the impact of credit rating announcements on stock prices, bond prices or both.
Loosely following the strand of literature on structural models, this paper investigates the determinants of bank CDS spreads, building upon the works of Annaert et al. (2010) , Boss and Scheicher (2005) , Raunig and Scheicher (2008) , among others.
Data Sample and Descriptive Statistics

Data description
The study considers only mid-tier and top-tier international banking groups (by total assets) with five-year senior CDS spreads. The decision to focus on CDS spreads in the banking sector had a decisive impact on sample size, given that only a limited number of banks are involved in CDS activities, and in credit derivatives in general. Indeed this type of business is highly concentrated among a restricted number of big banks. 8 There are overall 89 international banks with senior CDS spreads at 5 years. In addition, the decision to use quarterly balance sheet data rather than annual data reduced the sample as not all banks with CDS contracts report financial data on a quarterly basis. For these reasons, the final sample is thus composed of 57 international banks, 43 of which European, 7 are US, 4 are Australian and 3 Japanese banks. See Table A [Insert Figure 1] 
Dependent variable
This paper uses as dependent variable five-year senior CDS spreads in the banking sector. CDS spreads were chosen since they are widely considered an excellent indicator of markets' perception of a firm's default risk. The chosen data category, collected from Datastream, is 'CDS Premium Mid', which corresponds to the average of 'CDS premium bid' and 'CDS premium offered', and shows the mid rate spread between the entity and the relevant benchmark curve. The rate is expressed in basis points (bp). This study uses five-year quotes in so far as this is the benchmark maturity in the CDS market. Senior CDS spreads were used since senior offers better data coverage than subordinated. Quarterly CDS spreads were used, a choice strictly related to the type of explanatory variables considered (balance sheet variables). The daily frequency of CDS spreads was adjusted to that of the explanatory variables. Table A shows that just under half of sample banks recorded lower average CDS spread values than during the crisis period.
Nevertheless, almost all peak values were lower, with the exception of most of Portuguese, Spanish, Irish and Italian banks. In the post crisis period, bank CDS spreads of these countries, due to national debt crisis, grew again despite not to levels reached in the previous acute phase of the crisis. 9 Minimum values were higher than the previous period. The standard deviations of sample bank CDS spreads were almost all below average values.
Explanatory variables
This study uses as explanatory variables eight balance sheet ratios, in order of analysis profile precalculated by Bloomberg on the Global format. Quarterly data was selected rather than annual data to make available a higher number of observations for analysis.
The eight balance sheet ratios by management area and their hypotesed relationship (irrespective of the time horizon considered) with the dependent variable are outlined below and summarised in Table 1 .
Asset quality
Loan Loss Reserve/Gross Loans (%), qa1.
This ratio expresses the percentage value of total credits appropriated to the depreciation fund. It is a reserve for losses expressed as percentage of total loans. The higher the ratio, the lower the quality of the loan portfolio. Hence, an increase in qa1 should lead to an increase CDS spreads.
Unreserved Impaired Loans/Equity (%), qa2.
This ratio is also known as the 'capital impairment ratio'. An increase in the ratio should signal a greater probability of default. As such, a positive relationship between change in qa2 and change in CDS spreads is hypothesised.
Capital
TIER 1 Ratio 10 (%), pat1.
This ratio measures the capital adequacy of a bank. In particular, TIER 1 capital ratio measures the ability of the bank to absorb losses. The higher the ratio, the higher the risk buffer and the lower should be the CDS spreads. Hence, a negative sign is expected.
Leverage: Equity/Total Assets (%), pat2.
There are different definitions of leverage -balance sheet, economic, and embedded -and no single measure can capture all dimensions simultaneously. The first definition is based on balance sheet concepts, the second on market-dependent future cash flows, and the third on market risk. Balance sheet leverage is the most visible and widely recognised form and it is one adopted in this study.
The leverage ratio, defined as Equity/Total Assets, reflects the level of indebtedness of a firm. One would expect that as equity diminishes, with constant total assets, the proportion of debts to total assets should increase, as should the level of indebtedness and hence the risk of default. A negative sign is therefore expected between Leverage and CDS spreads.
With the choice of these two variables, we are close to Almer et al. (2008) who investigated the determinants of short-and long-term bank CDS spreads using cross-sectional regressions; the authors also used as explanatory variables the following: 'Insolvency Factors': Loan Loss Reserve (%), Loan Loss Provision (%), % of Problem Loans, Pre-Tax-Profit (%) and Long-term Rating.
Furthermore, leverage is the only explanatory variable used in this paper that is also present in Merton's model.
Operations
ROA (Return On average Assets) (%), op1.
This ratio is an indicator of the return on a firm's investments. The sign linking ROA to CDS spreads is uncertain, as the market may interpret the relationship between these variables either negatively or positively. In particular, a bank that undertakes numerous investments (low ROA) may be perceived by the market as being very risky. In this case, low ROA values would correspond to high CDS spreads. On the other hand, the market may react positively if it assumed that high levels of investment are capable of creating positive income and future cash flows. In this case moderate ROA values would correspond to low CDS spreads.
Further, a negative relationship between ROA and CDS may be due to a decrease (or an increase) in operating income at the same level of investment. In such case, a decrease (increase) in ROA would correspond to an increase (decrease) in CDS spreads.
ROE (Return On average Equity) (%), op2.
This ratio is an index of the return on own equity. The higher ratio, the lower the perceived default risk. Hence, a negative sign is expected. [Insert Table 1 ] Table 2 Unlike CDS spreads, the values of balance sheet variables did not change significantly from the precrisis period to the crisis period. The only exception is the average value of qa2. Furthermore, most sample banks recorded homogeneous values for almost all variables in all periods, with the exception of the banks that incurred vast losses during the crisis and/or were bailed out by government intervention (principally the UK, Irish and US banks).
In particular, the average value of qa1 remained substantially unchanged, from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period for almost all banks in the study. Conversely, the other indicator of asset quality, qa2, fell considerably, probably due to the numerous capital increases carried out by the banks in difficulty during the crisis. The average qa2 value of the sample banks decreased from 137 per cent in the pre-crisis period to 28 per cent during the crisis. This fall was principally attributable to two banks, Banco Espirito Santo and Credit Suisse, both of which recorded a significant fall in this index. Conversely, other sample banks -principally the UK, Irish and US banks -recorded strong growth in qa2 during the crisis. Such growth was the result of deterioration in the quality of capital, and affected the Belgian banks Dexia and KBC Groep NV, the Austrian Raiffeisen International
Bank Holding, the Swedish Swedbank AB and the Japanese Mizuho Financial Group.
The variables relating to the banks' financial structure, pat1 and pat2, remained substantially unchanged from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period. Overall, the majority of sample banks, despite being adversely affected by the crisis, exhibited a capital coefficient (pat1) well above the minimum regulatory threshold both before and during the crisis. The average value of pat2 declined from 5.3 per cent in the pre-crisis period to 5.1 per cent during the crisis. However, while the ratio of Equity to Total Assets remained substantially unchanged during the crisis for the majority of UK banks, it showed a tendency to increase for large European banks, but above all for US commercial banks. Overall, at a global level, the financial leverage of the sample banks remained high.
The profitability indices, op1 and op2, both declined, but at different rates. In particular, the average op1 value of sample banks fell by three percentage points, while average op2 values halved from 18 per cent to 4 per cent. During the crisis, negative average ROA and ROE values were recorded principally by UK, Irish and US banks.
The two liquidity indices considered, liq1 and liq2, show fairly similar average values between the pre-crisis period and the crisis period. In particular, the former ratio decreased slightly from 82 per cent to 80 per cent, while the latter decreased slightly from 48 per cent to 46 per cent.
The last panel of Table 2 highlights how in the post crisis period the average value of all eight balance sheet variables remained substantially unchanged with respect to the previous period. The exceptions were qa1, op1 and op2. In particular, in the post crisis period the average value of qa1
showed a tendency to grow (from 1.6 per cent to 2.5 per cent) principally due to an increase in devaluation of loans. The average value of the two income ratios continued to fall in the post crisis period, principally due to a significant deterioration in the asset quality of most sample banks. [Insert Table 2 ]
Time-series graphs were plotted to show the relationship between average bank CDS spreads and each explanatory variable. Furthermore, correlation coefficients were calculated between balance sheet variables and CDS spreads. During this period, the signs predicted in Table 1 
Empirical Methodology
To determine whether balance sheet data explains bank CDS spreads, we follow a panel data regression. Indeed, as our sample includes banks having both sufficient valid CDS spreads and quarterly accounting data (recall that the sample includes only mid-tier and top-tier international banking groups with five-year senior CDS spreads) it is not a random sample and it is possible to assume that our results could not be generalised to all banks.
In particular, we specify the following generic model:
where i is the subscript identifying the bank and t indicates the time period (the quarter in progress).
In this model we introduce only time-varying bank-specific explanatory variables (balance sheet ratios: BankBSratios) but not time-varying market-wide explanatory variables. d crisis is the dummy variable that identifies the outbreak of the recent financial crisis (1 July 2007) and ε it is the error.
In the first instance, the regressions were conducted covering the entire time horizon ( 14 In all the regressions, levels rather than differences were used, for both dependent and explanatory variables. Note that the goal of this paper is not to predict but to explain credit spreads, hence, we use contemporaneous dependent and explanatory variables. Table 4 Table 4 indicates that the balance sheet variables explain nearly 64 per cent of bank CDS spreads (Adjusted R-squared value); and that the balance sheet indices and the dummy crisis together explain 67 per cent of bank CDS spreads (Adjusted R-squared). From the first panel regression it emerges that, with the exception of liq1, all the explanatory variables are significant and have the expected sign (with two exceptions: qa2 is negative rather than positive, and pat1 is positive rather than negative).
Results
In the case of qa2, Panel B in Figure A shows how the relationship between this variable and bank CDS spreads was inversely proportionate during both the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. In particular, Panel B highlights how, in the pre-crisis period, high qa2 values corresponded to very low CDS spreads. This implies that in the pre-crisis period, the market was not concerned with the poor quality of bank loan portfolios. Moreover, Panel B shows that in the crisis period, a fall in qa2 resulted in a rise rather than a fall in bank CDS spreads. The abrupt decrease in this relationship is most probably attributable to the numerous capital increases carried out by many banks in difficulty during the crisis. Evidently, recapitalisation, particularly through injection of government funds, was perceived negatively by the market, as a sign of crisis in the banking sector. This may have contributed to the increase in bank CDS spreads. For an explanation of the reasons for the unexpected sign of pat1, see the discussion of the crisis period regression panel below.
From the second regression panel it emerges that the dummy crisis is significant and therefore indicates that the crisis was a relevant event in the relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet data, as expected. Table 4 ). Table 4 shows that the explanatory power of the balance sheet variables thus grew 5 per cent with the transition from the pre-crisis period to the crisis period (in terms of Adjusted R-squared). The lower explanatory power of the balance sheet ratios during the pre-crisis period is simply because bank CDS spreads were flat at that time. As bank CDS spreads grew, so did the explanatory power of the balance sheet variables. Overall, the Adjusted R-squared value well in excess of 50 per cent in both periods demonstrates how bank CDS spreads in the pre-crisis period, but above all in the crisis period, reflect a great deal of the risk expressed by the balance sheet variables. These results confirm those reported by Annaert et al. (2010) , which suggest that the variables used by structural credit risk models are not significant in explaining bank CDS spread changes in the period prior to the crisis.
In the period preceding the crisis qa1 and op1 are the only significant variables and the sign respect those predicted. The results in Table 4 shows a positive relationship between qa1 and bank CDS spreads. In terms of the relationship between op1 and CDS spreads, in the pre-crisis period the relationship was positive. Hence in the pre-crisis period, a decrease in op1 brought about a decrease rather than an increase in bank CDS spreads: evidently, the market associated the fall in ROA with a high level of investment capable of generating positive cash and income flows in future.
It also emerges that, as expected, in the pre-crisis period the bank CDS market did not pay attention to any liquidity index. The liquidity crisis (in terms of both market liquidity risk and funding risk) was the last manifestation of the recent financial crisis. This outcome confirms the findings of the study by Almer et al. (2008) , according to which 'Liquid Factors' did not have a significant impact on bank CDS spreads in the pre-crisis period.
In the crisis period, on the other hand, the number of significant explanatory variables increased with respect to the previous period This indicates that the CDS market probably pays greater attention to balance sheet indices particularly in periods of financial stress. However, only one of the explanatory variables that were significant during the crisis was significant also during the precrisis period: qa1. This implies that the type of variables to which the market pays attention tends to vary as economic and financial conditions vary. This is in line with the finding of Annaert et al. (2010) who finds that the determinants of bank CDS spreads vary strongly across time. This finding also confirms similar results in studies for bond spreads and indicates that models which attempt to explain changes in bank CDS spreads must be re-estimated as macroeconomic conditions change in order to give the "right" information to regulators and policy makers. The variables which were significant during the crisis are qa1, pat1, op2 and liq1. Conversely, op1 lost significance during the crisis period. In particular, as predicted, we find a positive relationship between qa1 and bank CDS spreads and a negative relationship between op2 and bank CDS spreads.
An analysis of the signs of two of the four significant variables reveals that the probability of default tends to increase principally for banks that in recent years had a poor quality loan portfolio, and/or lower returns on equity. This outcome confirms the findings of the study by Calice and Iannidis (2009) , according to which Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs) with large exposure to problems assets tend to be adeversely affected by the widening of credit spreads.
Our results also show that during the crisis period, the relationship between liq1 and CDS spreads was negative. During the crisis period, the decrease of liq1 was due principally to a decrease in loans (the so-called credit crunch phenomena) and was accompanied by an increase of bank CDS spreads.
Pat1, a significant explanatory variable during the crisis, has a different sign from the one expected: positive rather than negative. Pat1 was also positive during the pre-crisis period, although not significant. This positive relationship implies that the growth in pat1 was accompanied, in both the pre-crisis and the crisis period, by an increase rather than a decrease in the perceived probability of bank default. As Panel C of Figure A indicates, the positive relationship between pat1 and CDS spreads is particularly evident in the crisis period. The positive (rather than negative) sign of pat1 in Table 4 suggests that the market, above all in the crisis period, lacked faith in this capital index. The banks in difficulty in the final period, with rapidly growing CDS spreads, had a TIER 1 Ratio well in excess of the minimum requirement and also above the average for their geographical area. What emerges is thus the limited efficacy of the capital index TIER 1 Ratio in safeguarding banks from the potential risk of default. This is confirmed, at least in part, by the Basel Committee December 2010 final document (Basel 3), that focuses, among other things, on improving the quality of regulatory capital.
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From the results presented Table 4 it is also evident that qa2 and liq2 are not significant variables either in the pre-crisis or in the crisis period. Table 4 
Robustness Tests
As the main goal of this paper is not to predict but to explain credit spreads, in the empirical analysis we used contemporaneous dependent and explanatory variables. However, bank CDS spreads may precede balance sheet data or react to the publication of results. To test this hypothesis, a number of further regressions were carried out.
The first group of regressions considered bank CDS spreads at time t-1, the preceding quarter, and balance sheet data at time t, the quarter considered. The second group of panel regressions considered bank CDS spreads at time t+1, the quarter following, and balance sheet variables a time t. Both regressions with bank CDS spreads at time t-1 and those with bank CDS spreads at time t+1
were conducted on the overall period considered (1 January 200530 June 2011) and on all subperiods. Table 5 
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Comparison of the results of the panel regressions in Table 5 with those of the panel regressions of Table 4 , which consider both bank CDS spreads and balance sheet variables at time t, reveals that bank CDS spreads did not react in advance to the crisis and required less than a three month lag to incorporate balance sheet information. The CDS market is thus an efficient market capable of reacting to information as it is made public. For this reason, it is correct to consider both bank CDS spreads and balance sheet variables at time t. The Adjusted R-squared values in Table 4 in all three time periods are higher than those obtained considering bank CDS spreads at time t+1. Moreover, in two of the three periods, the crisis period and the post crisis period, values are marginally higher even than those obtained considering bank CDS spreads at time t-1.
[Insert Table 5] 
Conclusions
This paper investigates whether CDS spreads can be considered a good proxy for bank riskiness. Results indicate that bank CDS spreads in the pre-crisis period, but especially in the crisis and post crisis period, reflect the risk captured by balance sheet ratios. The lower explanatory power of the balance sheet indices in the pre-crisis period is mainly due to the fact that bank CDS spreads were relatively flat at that time. The crisis was a relevant event in the relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet data. As bank CDS spread grew, so did the explanatory power of the balance sheet variables. The relationship between bank CDS spreads and balance sheet ratios grew stronger during the crisis period, when a number of explanatory variables became significant. Furthermore, bank CDS spreads seem to be influenced by different variables in the pre-crisis and crisis period. This finding confirms similar results in studies for both bond and CDSs spreads and indicates that models which attempt to explain changes in bank CDS spreads must be re-estimated as macroeconomic conditions change in order to give the "right" information to regulators and policy makers. Our results also indicate that bank CDS spreads did not react in advance to the crisis and required less than a three month lag to incorporate the balance sheet information. The CDS market is thus an efficient market capable of reacting to information as it is made public. This cast doubts on the ability of CDS spreads to "predict" banks probability of default.
In terms of individual predictors, the ratio Loan Loss Reserve to Gross Loans is the only significant variable in all the three sub-periods considered. The probability of default is likely to increase principally for those banks with poor quality loan portfolios. Contrary to prior expectations, Leverage and the TIER 1 Ratio were not among the determinants of bank CDS spreads in any of the three sub-periods considered. What is more, the sample banks that ran into difficulty almost always had a TIER 1 Ratio well above the statutory minimum. Overall, doubts emerge in relation to the efficacy of the capital index TIER 1 Ratio as a safeguard against the risk of future default. Notes: This table reports summary statistics on eight explanatory balance sheet variables for the sample banks for the pre-crisis period ( (qa1, qa2, pat1, pat2, op1, op2, liq1, and liq2) Notes: The dependent variable is CDS spreads which measure the probability of default. The explanatory variables are balance sheet ratios referring to asset quality (qa1 and qa2), capital (pat1, pat2), operations (op1 and op2), and liquidity (liq1 and liq2). The dummy crisis identifies the start of the crisis ( Due to multicollinearity problem between capital explanatory variables (pat1 and pat2), for each time periods considered, the panel regression was performed using alternately the two capital ratios. Standard Errors of estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared derives from areg. *** denotes coefficient statistically different from zero (1% level, two-tail test), ** 5% level, * 10% level. Notes: The dependent variable is CDS spreads which measure the probability of default. The explanatory variables are balance sheet ratios referring to asset quality (qa1 and qa2), capital (pat1, pat2), operations (op1 and op2), and liquidity (liq1 and liq2). The dependent variable and the independent variables are defined respectively in paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3. 'CDS t-1' denotes CDS spread values for the quarter preceding the quarter in progress; 'CDS t+1' denotes CDS spreads for the quarter following the quarter in progress. The balance sheet data in both panel regressions are at time t (the quarter in progress). Due to multicollinearity problem between capital explanatory variables (pat1 and pat2), for each time periods considered, the panel regression was performed using alternately the two capital ratios. Standard Errors of estimated coefficients are reported in parentheses. Adjusted R-squared derives from areg. *** denotes coefficient statistically different from zero (1% level, two-tail test), ** 5% level, * 10% level. 
